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Abstract
Two enormously influential perspectives on courts offer fundamentally different
predictions about court outcomes and the effects of judge ideology on those outcomes. Wellknown to political scientists studying courts, the ideological voting (IV) literature argues that
judge ideology is a strong predictor of court outcomes and that those outcomes should be
proximate to the policy preferences of courts. Less known to political scientists but highly
influential, the law and economics perspective (LE) focuses on settlement behavior of litigants
who try to minimize costs and thus estimate likely outcomes in court, and settle simpler cases
pre-trial. In this case selection process litigants respond to cues that signal likely outcomes with
the result that only complex, less predictable cases make it to trial leading to win-rates that
coalesce at fifty percent for plaintiffs or defendants. From this perspective, litigant strategies
cancel out the effects of judge ideology and court outcomes do not correspond to judges’
ideological preferences. We reconcile these perspectives by examining tort cases in state supreme
courts from 1995 through 1998. The contrasting perspectives stem from the fundamental
institutional processes upon which each perspective is based. The LE perspective dominates in
states without lower appellate courts (LAC) where process of appeal in these state supreme courts
is litigant-driven, with win-rates hovering at fifty percent and deviations from that norm
accounted for by forces influencing litigant uncertainty. The ideological voting predicted by the
IV literature occurs primarily in the context of state supreme court strategic reversals of LAC
decisions---a process commensurate that operating with the U.S. Supreme Court. When it comes
to judicial outcomes, institutional structure is a critical element shaping the influence of litigant
strategy and judge ideology.
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Introduction
There is a well-established literature familiar to most political scientists who study courts
(henceforth labeled IV) that argues that judges, with preferences over policy outcomes, vote
ideologically when rendering judicial opinions (see e.g. Segal and Cover 1989; Segal 1997; Segal
and Spaeth 1993; Segal, Epstein, Cameron and Spaeth 1995; Gely and Spiller 1990; de Figuerido
and Tiller 1996; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989, 1995; Cross and Tiller 1998). This
literature has been vastly influential in political science approaches to studying law and courts.
There is another perspective perhaps less familiar to political scientists but nonetheless
important. The field of law and economics has provided a powerful account of how judicial
processes operate (henceforth labeled LE) (see e.g., Posner 1973; Eisenberg and Farber 1977;
Priest and Klein 1984; Witmann 1985; Kessler, Meites and Miller 1996). In their well known
“selection hypothesis” regarding disputes and litigation, Priest and Klein (1984) note that taking
cases to court has costs and this perspective deduces that litigant settlement behavior will seek to
avoid those costs where possible. Litigants make estimates of who is likely to win and lose and
simpler cases commonly settle in pre-trial. The cases that go to trial according to this perspective
are difficult, complex and less predictable. As there are no obvious winners or losers in these
cases, it is predicted that plaintiff/defendant win-rates will hover at fifty percent.1
The “fifty percent rule” has become a very prominent idea in the LE perspective,
discussed in major legal texts (Posner 1998; Polinsky 1989; Cooter and Ulen 1988) and
showcased as a fundamental feature of the LE field (Donahue 1988). While influential, there has
been a theoretical debate about strategy and/or rationality — that is, how the plaintiff/defendant
might predict the probability of winning . Kessler, et al. (1996) provide a survey of empirical
studies on the Priest-Klein hypothesis which notes that the fifty percent rule in its simplest form
had not been supported empirically in most of the empirical studies and suggest modifications to
1

In their seminal study, Priest and Klein (1984) found that plaintiffs consistently won 50% of the
time in sampled cases in the Cook County (Illinois) and Hamilton County (Ohio) courts.
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the rule. These modifications commonly focus on forces shaping the ability of litigants to deal
with uncertainty including the legal environment and litigant resources, as well as variations in
stakes at risk for litigants. Litigants with more resources, or more at stake, may be less eager to
settle pre-trial but ultimately may suffer losses greater than fifty percent.
One thing that does not seem to be in dispute in LE is that the case selection process
resulting from strategic litigants should cancel out the effects of judge ideology when it is known.
This presents a striking anomaly with the equally influential IV perspective that stresses the
importance of judge ideology on judicial outcomes. Within LE a sizable body of literature
derived from formal models argues that judges may be motivated ideologically but as long as that
ideology is known, litigants will make strategic decisions about whether to pursue their case with
that ideology in mind (Priest and Klein 1984; Wittman 1985, 1988; Waldfogel 1995). Because of
litigant strategies, courts hear non-random samples of cases. Litigants seeking liberal
(conservative) outcomes don’t pursue their cases in conservative (liberal) courts. If a litigant
needs a liberal outcome but faces a conservative court they have more incentive to settle pre-trial
or to drop the case. The opposite would also hold. The cases that go to court either have no
obvious ideological direction or were there based on miscalculations by one of the litigants. Such
miscalculation could go in either direction in the long run. In the end, according to this
perspective, the effects of judge ideology should be nullified by litigant strategy.
If judges are voting ideologically to produce outcomes that are proximate to their own
policy preferences, as suggested by the IV literature, it would stand to reason that
defendant/plaintiff win-rates should not coalesce around fifty percent if courts are markedly
liberal or conservative. In tort cases we would expect to see more outcomes favoring plaintiffs
where courts are more liberal, and more outcomes favoring defendants where courts are more
conservative (Sheehan, Mishler and Songer 1992).
There is another notable difference between the IV and LE approaches.
Overwhelmingly, the IV literature has been focused on the United States Supreme Court although
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there have been studies of federal appeals and state supreme courts as well (Brace and Hall
1995; Giles, Hettinger and Peppers 2001; Langer 2002; Brace and Boyea 2004). Alternatively,
the LE literature on case selection has focused primarily on trial courts (see e.g. Waldfogel 1998)
although there are some exceptions (Hanssen 1999; Clermont 2000). While it could be that
ideological voting operates in the highest court in the land, but is canceled out by strategic litigant
case selection in trial or lower appellate courts, this is by no means an obvious conclusion.
Indeed, if there is anywhere in the American judiciary where the ideology of judges is wellknown, it is in the United States Supreme Court. While judges in state trial courts or state
supreme courts are not as prominent as justices on the United States Supreme Court, lawyers
commonly make it their business to gauge the preferences of judges they argue cases before and
their long-run professional and financial success commonly hinge on these estimates.
We argue below that these seemingly opposed perspectives can be productively
reconciled by considering institutional design and forces driving cases reaching appeal. To
consider this we examine all tort cases decided by state supreme courts in the years 1995 though
1998.2 We distinguish between states with and without lower appellate courts (LAC). State
supreme courts without LACs have non-discretionary dockets and we reason the appeal process is
litigant driven in these courts. The cases that go to appeal are the result of litigant calculations
influenced by the degree of uncertainty litigants bear. As certainty goes up, we reason that
deviations from the fifty percent rule will go down. Moreover, we would predict that judge
ideology would not influence outcomes in these courts because litigants adjust their strategies to
incorporate judge ideology. While these are appeals, in states without LACs, they resemble
decisions to go to trial because they are exclusively litigant driven.
Other states have LACs and their supreme courts have discretion to let lower court
2

These data are found within the State Supreme Court Data Archive (SSCDA), which includes a
near universal sample of state supreme court cases from 1995 to 1998. State dockets exceeding
200 cases in a single year are selected from a random sample of 200 cases. In most instances,
case quantities, including tort case quantities, are unaffected due to the limited size of many state
supreme court dockets.
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decisions stand or to hear a case. While litigant strategies will still play a large role in selecting
cases for further appeal, judge strategy ultimately determines which cases get on the docket.
Unlike their counterparts in non-LAC states, jurists in these supreme courts operate in an
environment more like the United States Supreme Court. They get to choose from all non-settled
cases the ones they wish to decide, allowing them an opportunity to exercise their ideological
preferences through agenda control.
We thus might expect to find judge ideological preferences operating in courts with
discretionary dockets but not necessarily in all outcomes. Recent research has offered a new
perspective on the effects of ideology in the United States Supreme Court that is relevant here.
McGuire, Smith and Caldeira (2004) reason that parties seeking review from the US Supreme
Court are rational actors who have lost in a lower court and petition the high court only when they
estimate they will win on the merits. When litigants estimate that their preferred outcome is
closer to the preferences of the justices than to the outcome they received in the lower court, they
will pursue an appeal to the high court. Alternatively, litigants typically do not pursue their case
to the high court if they perceive the lower court’s decision will be affirmed: it would be a waste
of time and money.
Ultimately, not all litigants pursuing appeals to the US Supreme Court make accurate
calculations. Inaccurate calculations result in affirmances of lower court decisions and McGuire,
Smith and Caldeira argue that these cases are not likely to provide evidence of ideological voting.
Alternatively, when petitioners make accurate calculations about the ideological preferences of
the court, lower court decisions are reversed. What is particularly notable about this important
insight for current purposes is that the accurate estimates (reversals) should reflect the prevailing
ideology of the court, while inaccurate estimates (affirmances) will not. When it comes to the
American states, the appellate structure in states with LACs resembles the process operating
below the United State Supreme Court. These state supreme courts have the discretion to make
strategic reversals and we would thus hypothesize that judge ideology should exert an influence
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in reversals of lower court cases.
We select tort litigation in state supreme courts for analysis. This choice is justified on
several grounds. First, it is the area of law commonly examined in analyses of case selection
processes and win-rates and provides the best evidence for the hypothesized processes
(Eisenberg 1990). Second, tort cases are commonly examined because they lend themselves to
the types of strategic calculations presumed to affect the distribution of cases that come to courts.
Litigants face potential costs and benefits from litigation and from pre-trial settlement and must
weigh their choices strategically. Such calculations are decidedly different from those in criminal
proceedings or in cases involving civil rights or liberties where the stakes and cost calculations
are significantly different. Convicted criminals will often exhaust all appeals. Social groups
commonly persist in courts against short odds to achieve desired civil reforms in the long-run.
Third, tort cases commonly have an ideological direction. Plaintiffs, typically individuals or
groups representing individuals, seek compensation for damages caused by a business,
professional, or government. A decision in favor of a plaintiff is commonly viewed as a liberal
outcome while one favoring defendants is construed as a conservative outcome (e.g. Sheehan,
Mishler, and Songer 1992; Yates, Tankesley, and Brace 2005). There are clear liberal and
conservative sides to most tort cases and it is an area of law where it is reasonable to expect
judges’ ideology to exert an influence. When it comes to torts, litigants face conventional
strategic imperatives in cases with ideological dimensions. These are ideal conditions for
considering how strategic case selection processes and judge ideology may interactively operate
in American state supreme courts.
In the analysis below we posit two fundamentally different processes to be operating in
American state supreme courts in tort litigation that have significant influences on win-rates and
on the effects of judge ideology in influencing judicial outcomes. Before considering these
specific hypotheses it will be useful to explore the nature of win-rates in tort cases in state
supreme courts to gauge how well the fifty percent hypothesis performs regarding these outcomes
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and, conversely, any prima facie evidence of clear ideological bias.

Analyzing Plaintiff Win-Rates in State Supreme Courts
We divide our consideration of win-rates among states that have and do not have LACs
for the reasons noted above. Table 1 presents plaintiff win-rates in twelve areas of tort litigation
appealed before state supreme courts. Our first concern is whether there is widespread evidence
of departures from the fifty percent expectation. The statistical test here is a Bernoulli trial.
Those trials are modeled by a random variable which can take only two values, 0 and 1, with 1
being thought of as "success". If P is the probability of success, then the expected value of such a
random variable is p. p is estimated with the number of observer successes out of the total
number of trials with variance p (1-p). Just as in the conventional test for a fair coin, evidence of
bias requires a combination of departures from the fifty percent norm and a sufficient number of
trials. In the current example, there may be no significant evidence of departure from the fifty
percent rule even if the observed win-rates appear to favor one side or the other if there are
insufficient observations to render a strong probabilistic conclusion. Alternatively, there may be
seemingly modest bias in some states but substantially more cases and such modest bias may
nonetheless be statistically significant.
Examining Table 1 the most notable feature of these win-rates is that only one category
of tort (i.e. discrimination) is statistically different from fifty percent, and that is only in states
with LACs. This pattern would seem to provide compelling evidence for the fifty percent
hypothesis. If we assume there is an ideological direction to tort cases, there is little evidence of
ideological bias in outcomes when grouped by area of law.
[Table 1 here]
The effects of ideological bias could be masked when grouping cases by areas of law.
Ideological bias could be more likely at the court level. Table 2 illustrates it is modest at best.
The thirty-six states presented in this table had plaintiff win-rates that were not statistically
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different from fifty percent. Consistent with the fifty percent case selection hypothesis,
plaintiffs and defendants who go to appeal win at rates that are statistically indistinguishable in
almost three-quarters of state supreme courts.
[Table 2 here]
While limited, there is some evidence of ideological bias in the states listed in Table 3.
Fourteen states had win-rates that were statistically different from fifty percent and ten of these
had LACs. Of the fourteen, only three were biased in favor of the plaintiff while eleven tilted
toward the defendants. Two of the three courts favoring plaintiffs had a LAC. Overall, the
evidence concerning ideological bias in tort appeals in state supreme courts is sparse when
viewed from the perspective of win-rates. In sum, bias is the exception rather than the rule, it is
predominantly conservative and it is most likely to occur in courts with discretionary dockets.
Overall, tort outcomes in state supreme courts correspond remarkably well to the fifty percent
hypothesis when viewed by area of law or even on a court-by-court basis.
[Table 3 here]
The preliminary evidence would suggest that strategic litigants are acting in the manner
hypothesized by the fifty percent rule. We can look below the surface to see if in fact variations
in win-rates are influenced by factors that could be reasoned to shape uncertainty. While
significant departures from fifty percent win-rates are the exception and not the norm, there is
nonetheless variation in the degree of departure from this norm. As we reason below, we expect
to see smaller departures from the fifty percent norm when litigants have a stronger basis for
estimating potential outcomes. The magnitude of departure from fifty percent should increase as
a function of uncertainty that litigants face if case selection is litigant driven as we hypothesize it
is in states without LACs. This expectation does not extend to outcomes in courts with LACs
because case selection in those courts is a joint function of litigant and court strategies. In these
courts litigants need to pursue their appeal and the court has to grant review.
resembles that operating in the US Supreme Court.
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This process

This distinction is not trivial. The majority of literature concerning the effects of
ideology on court outcomes centers on the United States Supreme Court while the preponderance
of literature on the fifty percent rule focuses on trial courts. As we reason below, conflicting
hypotheses concerning the effects ideology has on outcomes in tort cases can be resolved by
taking the appellate structure and the nature of the judicial vote into consideration.
I. Uncertainty and the Fifty Percent Win-Rate Rule
The LE perspective posits that win-rates are driven by litigant strategies and that, other
things being equal, plaintiffs and defendants should experience wins at fifty percent because the
cases that actually reach the bench do not have obvious or simple solutions. From this
perspective, it is uncertainty about outcomes that leads cases to go to court. Given this basic
premise, we would expect that institutional and contextual variables that reduce uncertainty
should also reduce departures from the fifty percent win-rate hypothesis in states without LACs.
As noted above, our expectations about the effects of these influences are weaker when it comes
to states with LACs.
Strategic litigants would be expected to try to estimate the preferences of courts.
Uncertainty results from two sources. First, features of courts may increase the accuracy of
litigant estimates of court preferences. Second, litigants may vary in their capability to make
estimates of likely outcomes. We consider each of these categories below.
Features of Courts.
What can reduce uncertainty for litigants about prospective outcomes? Judge seniority
should provide information about judge preferences. Judges with a longer history on the bench
would have a track-record and litigants would have a stronger basis for estimating the likely
outcome of an appeal so we would expect average judge seniority on a court to reduce deviations
from the fifty percent win-rate. At the other extreme, if a court is primarily comprised of very
junior or freshman jurists, then litigants have little basis for guessing how the court might decide
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their case. This, in turn, may cause errors in estimation and deviation from the fifty percent
expectation.
Court size should operate in a similar manner. State supreme courts range in size from
three to nine justices. When courts are have more justices there is a larger amount of information
about voting preferences of the judges and less turns on the proclivities of one or two justices.
Furthermore, larger deliberative entities are generally regarded as providing more accurate,
consistent, and reliable decisions (Abramowicz 2000; Surowieki 2004). We would expect that
larger courts provide better and more plentiful information for prospective appellants and as a
consequence, there should be less deviation from the fifty percent win-rate hypothesis in states
with larger state supreme courts.
Hanssen (1999) makes a compelling case for the effects of judicial elections on litigation.
He reasons that elected judges are more predictatable than appointed judges. Judicial
appointment is intended to promote judicial independence and these judges should be less
predictable (Landes and Posner 1975). While Hanssen’s concern is with litigation rates (i.e.,
more cases go to trial when there is less certainty about judge preferences), the hypothesis should
also extend to win-rates. Specifically, we would expect smaller deviations from the fifty percent
win-rate norm when there is more information about judge preferences and, following Hanssen’s
logic, we hypothesize that elected justices are more predictable in their voting. Deviations from
the fifty percent win-rate should be smaller in states that elect their state supreme court justices.3
State supreme courts vary substantially in the resources they have to support their
operations. Court professionalization has been shown to influence court outcomes (Brace and
Hall 2001; Hero 1998; Yates, Tankersley and Brace 2005). More professionalized courts have

3

To operationalize states with elected methods of selection, we have separated those states with
elective methods of re-selection from those states with appointive or retention election formats.
Twenty states use either partisan or non-partisan elections to retain incumbent judges, while
another thirty states use appointive methods of selection or non-competitive retention elections.
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more staff, higher operating budgets, and smaller dockets providing them with more time and
resources for their deliberations. Other things being equal, increased professionalization
increases the likelihood that courts will produce more defensible and legally consistent decisions
that are less likely to be subsequently overturned. Courts with overcrowded dockets and very
limited resources are more prone to error and are less predictable as a consequence. We would
expect higher levels of state supreme court professionalization to reduce litigant uncertainty about
prospective outcomes and, as a result, we would anticipate deviations from fifty percent win-rates
to be smaller in states with more professionalized state supreme courts.
In courts where judges serve longer terms, litigants have a stronger basis for estimating
likely outcomes. The more litigants can learn about judge preferences, the fewer miscalculations
will be made about pursuing their appeal. On courts where judges serve long terms, litigants and
their counsel have a stronger basis for estimating prospective outcomes and cases with obvious
solutions should be less likely to go to appeal. We thus hypothesize that where courts have
longer terms, deviations from the fifty percent rule should be smaller.4
The LE approach reasons that while judges may vote ideologically, litigants would soon
key in on these ideological proclivities and the effects of judge ideology on outcomes would be
nullified.5 The reason for this is quite simple. Litigants with cases with liberal dimensions
would be unlikely to appeal an adverse trial outcome to a conservative court. A plaintiff that lost
4

Length of judicial term varies substantially among the states from six years to fourteen years in
forty-seven states. Three states additionally – Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island
– designate lifetime terms for state supreme court justices. For both Massachusetts and Rhode
Island, which do not restrict term, we have operationalized term length using an exogenous value,
the average United States life expectancy (US Center for Disease Control 2003), and subtracted
the age of entry from that value. For New Hampshire which has mandatory retirement at the age
of seventy, we have subtracted the age of entry from seventy. While no single measure is
completely satisfactory for lifetime tenure states, perceived duration of term is largely satisfied by
this approach.
5
We in fact tested judicial ideology (both in levels and change) in auxiliary models using both
our main dependent variable (absolute deviations from fifty-percent) and an alternative dependent
variable (deviations from fifty-percent, with lower values indicating defendant favoring
deviations and higher values indicating plaintiff favoring deviations) and found that ideology did
not have any statistically significant effect on either measure of deviation from the fifty percent
win-rate expectation.
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a medical malpractice suit at trial should not be inclined to appeal that outcome to a higher court
known to be conservative. This selection process means that this conservative court seldom
receives cases where they can exhibit their ideological preferences. The same would be true for
liberal state supreme courts. A firm successfully sued at trial for negligence would be unlikely to
appeal that outcome to a liberal state supreme court. However, what if there was uncertainty
about judge ideology? We might expect new membership on a court to produce ideological
change and this change could increase litigant uncertainty resulting in greater departures from the
fifty percent norm.
Litigant Capability
Litigants commonly vary in terms of their capabilities (Galanter 1974) and this should be
particularly true in tort cases where plaintiffs are typically inexperienced individual litigants who
are taking a “single-shot,” pitted against defendant businesses who are often well seasoned
“repeat players” in court. Because they have more resources and experiences we would expect
such defendants to make fewer errors in estimation concerning the outcome of an appeal.
Plaintiffs, alternatively, should be more plagued by uncertainty because of their comparative
disadvantage in resources and experience in court. Because of this, we expect the departure from
the fifty percent norm to increase as the proportion of plaintiff appeals increases in states
without LACs.6 Misjudgments by plaintiffs are not expected to promote bias in outcomes in
states with LACs because courts would typically be disinclined to hear cases they would affirm.
Our dependent variable for our first analysis is the degree of deviation in
plaintiff/defendant win-rates from fifty percent (i.e. outcome bias). The LE perspective posits a
general equilibrium of fifty percent in these win-rates conditioned by the factors influencing
litigant uncertainty. We further posit that these forces should operate when the case selection
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We would also expect the direction of this bias to be in favor of defendants if in fact plaintiffs
were inclined to misestimate their chances in court. In auxiliary analyses we in fact find
significant bias in favor of the defendant in plaintiff initiated appeals, suggesting a higher level of
strategic miscalculation by plaintiffs.
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process is driven by litigant strategies but not where judges have discretion over which cases
they hear. We thus divide our analysis of the effects of uncertainty on outcome bias into states
with and without LACs.
II. Ideology, Appellate Structure and Strategic Reversals
In our second analysis we consider the conditions under which state supreme court
justices’ voting can be explained by the ideological voting hypothesized in the IV literature. Our
dependent variable for this analysis is simply the proportion of liberal voting outcomes (i.e.,
justices’ votes for plaintiffs) per annum in tort cases in state supreme courts (liberal vote
proportion). As noted above, McGuire, Smith and Caldeira (2004) (see also McGuire and
Stimson 2004) make a convincing case that the effects of ideology on outcomes should be
conditioned by nature of the case. Appellants may make accurate and inaccurate estimates of the
preferences of judges and courts may choose to review cases or not. Affirmances of lower courts
occur when a petitioner misestimates the appellate court’s ideology. They are no better off than
they were before they brought the appeal and have had to bear additional costs of litigation.
These cases represent strategic miscalculations and are not expected to provide evidence of
ideological voting. Alternatively, reversals occur when a petitioner accurately estimates that the
outcome of their case in a lower court would be overturned in the higher court. Because the
appellate process operates primarily to correct error, these strategic reversals cases are expected
to be more frequent; given discretionary jurisdiction, courts would generally let lower court
decisions they favor stand and intervene to reverse lower court decisions they oppose.
When courts have discretion over their dockets they should select cases for review with
lower court outcomes that are inconsistent with their preferences. A conservative court should
reverse liberal lower court outcomes and liberal courts should reverse conservative lower court
outcomes. It is in these cases where the effects of justice ideology should be evident (McGuire,
Smith and Caldeira, 2004; McGuire and Stimson 2004). From this perspective the influence of
judge ideology on judicial outcomes is contingent on court discretion and the type of case being
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heard. Following this reasoning, we expect the effects of judge ideology to surface in states
with LACs in reversals. We do not expect ideology to have an impact in courts with nondiscretionary dockets, or in affirmances.
Ultimately, we thus posit that the effects of court ideology on outcomes in tort cases (at
least) in state supreme courts are contingent upon the fundamental structure of the court system.
The implication is that the effect of judge ideology on outcomes is, at root, a matter of
institutional design. When judges have discretion to select cases, ideology matters. When they
do not have this discretion, litigant strategies and the effects of uncertainty cancel out the
influence of judge ideology on outcomes in tort appeals. The variables discussed above for both
of our analyses are defined and described in Table 4.
Results
I. Uncertainty and Deviations from the Fifty Percent Win-Rate
We begin with our findings for absolute deviations from the fifty percent hypothesis. Our
dependant variable is, again, the percentage of wins by the plaintiff minus fifty percent, expressed
as an absolute value.7 Our interest is with influences that may operate to promote or retard
departures from the expected equilibrium of fifty percent. We compare the effects of these
variables for all states and then contrast their effects for states with and without LACs. Our
expectation is these variables will function most effectively when the appellate process is litigant
driven (i.e., when there is no LAC) and less effectively when judges can act strategically in
selecting cases for review as is the case when there are LACs.8

7

As previously discussed in footnote five, in an auxiliary analysis we found directional biases
favoring one party or the other, depending on context. For this dependent variable, we consider
the absolute deviation of differences from fifty percent because we are interested in discerning the
generalizable factors that lead to litigant error in either direction.
8
Our unit of analysis is the state-year and our variables represent state-year averages of aspects
of all tort cases filed in state supreme courts. Variation among the quantity of tort appeals before
the state supreme courts (used to compute such averages) may affect the overall model; therefore,
weights related to the quantity of tort appeals are incorporated to account for such
differences. We use analytical weights (aweights in STATA) to address this variance in the
number of tort appeals in state supreme courts. In STATA, aweights, or analytic weights, are
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The Overall model presented in column one of Table 5 explains approximately 27
percent of the variance and performs reasonably well. In this model the correctly signed and
statistically significant coefficients for size of court, justice term length, and elected method of
selection provide support for our hypotheses. These results conform to our expectations: when
there are more judges, there are longer terms, and when you elect judges, litigants face less
uncertainty and win-rates stay closer to fifty percent, other things being equal.
[Insert Table 5]
When we consider the results for states with LACs in column two no single variable
emerges as a significant influence on deviations from the fifty percent norm. This stands in
striking contrast to the results for states without LACs in column three. As hypothesized, court
size, elected method of selection, and longer judicial terms receive directional support and are
statistically significant. Substantively, larger state supreme courts decrease deviation from fifty
percent support for the plaintiff by approximately 4.5 percent per additional justice. Elected
courts reduce departure from fifty percent by over 11 percent and a standard deviation increase in
justices’ term lengths (3.47 years) is associated with an almost 3 percent decrease in deviation. In
addition, plaintiffs’ appeals are strongly and significantly associated with deviations from the
fifty percent norm. For every ten percent increase in the number of plaintiff appeals, there is a
3.8 percent departure from the fifty percent norm. Since plaintiffs are commonly “single-shot”
individuals going up against “repeat player” organizations, this finding is consistent with
capability theories of litigation. Plaintiffs appear less capable of estimating outcomes.
It is notable that ideology exerts no statistically discernable effects on win-rates within
either appellate structure. In addition to the ideological change measure reported above, in
auxiliary analyses we also considered the effects of basic ideology, and the effects of both
weights that are inversely proportional to the variance of an observation; i.e., the variance of the
j-th observation is assumed to be sigma2/w_j, where w_j are the weights. Thus, the observations
represent averages and the weights are the number of elements that gave rise to the average. See
http://www.stata.com/help.cgi?weights . Analytical weights allow modification
to the ordinary least squares procedure where heteroskedastic error may exist (Kennedy 1998).
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measures of ideology, on percentage of plaintiff victories. We found no significant effects for
either measure of ideology on either absolute bias or direction of bias. The uniform null result
concerning ideology would conform to the LE thesis that case selection processes cancels out the
effects of judge ideology.
What ultimately emerges from the comparison of findings between the two appellate
systems illustrates the effect of LACs, court discretion, and litigant strategies on case selection
and outcomes. When there are LACs the variables we hypothesize to influence litigant
uncertainty exert no influence on deviations from the fifty percent win-rate. Presumably litigant
strategies are being confounded by court strategies when they can exercise discretion to hear
cases. Alternatively, where there are no LACs, deviations from the fifty percent norm are
significantly smaller where courts are larger, where judges are elected, and where judge terms are
longer. On these courts, deviations from the fifty percent norm are significantly higher where
there are higher proportions of plaintiff appeals, indicating that litigant ability to estimate
uncertainty also plays a role. In combination, institutional features and litigant capabilities,
conditioned by the appellate structure, significantly influence departures from the fifty percent
norm anticipated by the LE perspective.
II. Ideology, Appellate Structure and Strategic Reversals
In this analysis we consider the effects of ideology on outcomes, taking into
consideration the nature of the case (affirmances versus reversals) and the nature of the appellate
court structure with the expectation that the effects of ideology will be evident only in reversals in
states with LACs.
Table 6 presents the analysis of proportion of judge votes favoring plaintiffs, which we
contend is a reflection of liberal outcomes. We would expect liberal judges to support plaintiffs
more than conservative judges. We have divided our analysis into votes in reversals where theory
would lead us to expect ideological voting, and affirmances, where the same theory would predict
no ideology effects. Following past practice, we also divide our analysis into states with and
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without the discretionary docket control afforded by the presence of a LAC. We anticipate that
judicial discretion in case selection is a necessary condition for ideological influence on
outcomes.
The results in Table 6 conform exactly to the expectations offered by McGuire, et al., and
the supplemental caveat we offer here. Specifically, ideological voting in these tort cases is
evident in reversals but not in affirmances just as McGuire, et al., posit. However, this
relationship emerges only in judicial structures where the courts have discretionary dockets, much
like the US Supreme court. In these instances, we surmise, courts can issue strategic reversals
that fit their ideological preferences. Alternatively, the effects of ideology are not evident in
states without LACs in either reversals or affirmances. We surmise this is because in these states
the case selection process is driven exclusively by litigant case selection processes that operate to
cancel out the influence of judge ideology. We also do not find significant ideological effects in
affirmances more generally. Like McGuire et al., we surmise these cases are the result of
miscalculations on the part of the petitioner which nullifies the effects of judge ideology.

Conclusion
The findings presented above shed light on the foundations of the empirical support for
two major theoretical approaches to the understanding of judicial processes and should help
researchers understand the role institutional structure plays in shaping the judicial process and
judicial outcomes. Our results provide support for both the LE and the IV perspectives but reveal
several important conditions that allow each explanation to function. Specifically, the LE
hypotheses of the fifty percent win-rate operates where case selection is litigant-driven and
departures from it are shaped by institutional factors that influence levels of uncertainty for
litigants, and the ability of litigants to deal with uncertainty. This model does not function well
where case selection is shaped by judicial discretion. While litigants no doubt remain strategic in
these situations, it is the court that ultimately shapes the docket in LAC states and variables
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reasoned to influence litigant strategies were not significant in these states.
When it comes to the effects of judge ideology, the opposite is true. As predicted by the
LE approach, judge ideology does not exert an influence on outcomes when case selection is
litigant-driven. Presumably litigants take the ideological preferences of courts into consideration
when they decide to take their case to court (or not). Consistent with IV approaches, we find that
ideology emerges as appropriately signed and statistically significant in cases involving reversals.
This effect, however, is limited to courts afforded discretionary control of their dockets by the
presence of LACs (much like the US Supreme Court).
We believe these findings have far-reaching implications for broad understandings of the
judicial process. In our judicial system there are two fundamental processes operating. One is
litigant-driven, occurring primarily at the trial level but also in appellate courts without
discretionary jurisdiction. The rule of law from these litigated cases results from a case selection
process that tends to weed out cases with more obvious or ideological solutions. The other
system is driven by the complex interplay of litigant strategies and judge/court discretion.
Litigants unsatisfied with lower court rulings may strategize that a higher court will sympathize
with their plight but whether their case is heard or not is in the hands of the court. Consistent
with McGuire et al., specifically, and the IV literature more generally, a system of ideological
judge voting is evident. Courts strategically reverse lower court rulings when they have
discretionary control of their docket.
Judicial outcomes are a product of litigant strategies and judge preferences mediated by
institutional structures. We have identified the conditions where litigant strategies play a sizable
role, and where judge ideology exerts a significant influence. Comprehensive theories of judicial
decision-making must consider both the processes that do and do not shape court dockets, and the
conditions under which judges may register their preferences. When courts do not have docket
control, litigant strategies operate to cancel out judge ideological effects. When courts can pick
their cases they may strategically reverse lower court decisions and exhibit their ideological
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preferences. Judge ideology is not universally important or unimportant but conditional on the
structure of the court and the nature of the case.
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Table 1
Plaintiff Success Rates by Areas of Tort Litigation
within States without Lower Appellate Courts
State
Automobile
Discrimination
Libel
Medical Malpractice
Labor - Miscellaneous
Premises Liability - Government
Premises Liability - Private
Product Liability
Professional Malpractice
Toxic
Workers' Injury - Government
Workers' Injury - Private

State Has No Lower
Appellate Court (N)
48.89% (194)
45.12% (46)
45.00% (52)
53.29% (105)
44.70% (23)
46.40% (51)
50.30% (123)
43.78% (74)
41.79% (89)
28.79% (17)
53.93% (175)
47.84% (285)

State Has Lower
Appellate Court (N)
53.08% (471)
44.11% (139)
45.04% (115)
44.67% (386)
61.17% (82)
46.81% (155)
53.14% (343)
52.01% (293)
45.78% (290)
44.57% (62)
46.46% (322)
51.35% (688)

Note: Entries in bold are statistically different from 50 percent at the .05 level
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Table 2
Plaintiff Win-Rates
Not Significantly Different from Fifty Percent

State

Plaintiff Win-Rates (N)

Alaska
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin

42.28% (149)
45.21% (73)
51.89% (106)
45.28% (106)
56.36% (55)
52.00% (75)
56.92% (65)
49.25% (67)
63.46% (52)
46.07% (89)
53.33% (90)
46.83% (126)
42.42% (165)
50.00% (86)
52.13% (94)
45.30% (181)
53.73% (67)
52.91% (206)
50.43% (234)
54.81% (104)
56.38% (94)
61.82% (55)
45.37% (108)
51.79% (56)
42.67% (150)
50.00% (188)
53.62% (138)
50.39% (127)
46.91% (162)
47.11% (154)
56.30% (119)
47.12% (104)
55.63% (151)
48.39% (93)
51.16% (172)
40.28% (72)
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Lower
Appellate
Court
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y

Table 3
Plaintiff Win-Rates Statistically Different From Fifty Percent (.05 level)

State

Plaintiff Win-Rates (N)

Lower
Appellate
Court

Favored Defendant
Alabama
Arkansas
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa
Massachusetts
Minnesota
South Dakota
Texas
Vermont
Wyoming

44.01% (309)
37.11% (159)
39.04% (146)
39.29% (112)
30.73% (179)
31.68% (101)
40.00% (110)
35.71% (154)
29.68% (219)
33.75% (80)
24.34% (152)

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
N

Favored Plaintiff
Arizona
Nevada
Oregon

80.95% (42)
60.00% (110)
65.31% (49)

Y
N
Y
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Table 4
Variable Descriptions for Models of Vote Instability and the
Proportion of Liberal Votes
Dependent Variables
Outcome Bias
Liberal Vote Proportion

Value Description
= absolute value (observed plaintiff win-rate – 50 %)
= proportion of justice votes in favor of plaintiff

Mean
10.44
.48

Std.Dev.
8.15
.12

Min/Max
0/39.66
.13/.89

Independent Variables
Court Ideology

Value Description
= measure of state supreme court liberalism, ranging conservative to liberal
(Brace, Langer and Hall 2000)
= 1 if state supreme court justices are elected
0 otherwise
= absolute value (observed court ideology – previous year’s court ideology)
= percentage of cases that are plaintiff initiated appeals
= factor score of staff, salary, docket, and justices per capita, ranging nonprofessionalized to highly professionalized (Brace and Hall 2001)
= average years of justice service by state supreme court
= number of justices on state supreme court
= length of the term (in years) for state supreme court justices

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min/Max

39.31

16.14

5.52/81.39

.42

.49

2.22
65.47

3.12
16.98

0/20.73
12.50/100

.001

.96

-1.25/4.83

8.47
6.44
9.08

2.96
1.27
3.47

2.88/18.9
5/9
6/20

Elect
Ideological Change
Plaintiff Appeals
Professionalization
Seniority
Size
Term
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Table 5
Win-Rates in Tort Cases
Predicting Deviations from Fifty Percent Plaintiff/ Defendant
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Dependent Variable: Abs. Val[Obs. Plaintiff Win-rate – 50 percent]

Coef.
Seniority
Size
Elect
Professionalization
Term
Plaintiff Suit
Ideological Change
Constant
N
R2
Rho

0.3449
-0.7736
-2.2138
-0.4397
-0.2247
-0.0014
-0.1346
0.3449

Overall
s.e.

States with Lower Appellate Courts
Coef.
s.e.
t

t
1.19
-2.13
-3.13
-1.28
-1.81
-0.04
-0.69
2.43

0.2891
0.3625
0.7066
0.3426
0.1240
0.0411
0.1954
0.2891

141
.27
.15

0.2635
-0.2265
0.4268
-0.0265
0.1637
-0.0495
0.0486
9.3255

0.3836
0.4352
1.6392
0.1627
0.1095
0.0543
0.2626
4.9821

108
.32
.19

Entries in bold are significant at the .05 level. (Year dummy variables included in the model are not displayed).
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0.69
-0.52
0.26
-0.16
1.49
-0.91
0.19
1.87

States without Lower Appellate Courts
Coef.
s.e.
t
-0.3910
-4.6834
-11.1271
0.8922
-0.8496
0.3842
-0.3473
26.7624
33
.50
-.02

0.6694
1.4855
1.1585
2.3610
0.2738
0.1485
0.3614
10.4032

-0.58
-3.15
-9.60
0.38
-3.10
2.59
-0.96
2.57

Table 6
Predicting the Liberal Proportion of State Supreme Courts Votes in Tort Cases
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Votes Favoring Plaintiff

Court Ideology
Constant
N
R2
rho

Combined
Coef.
s.e.
0.0005
0.0006
0.4399
0.0220
200
.81
.25

Court Ideology
Constant
N
R2
rho

Coef.
0.0015
0.4034
156
.85
.23

s.e.
0.0005
0.0193

t
2.88
20.93

Court Ideology
Constant
N
R2
rho

Coef.
-0.0008
0.4911
44
.63
.21

s.e.
0.0009
0.0336

t
-0.92
14.62

t
0.93
19.96

States with and without Lower Appellate Courts
Reversal
Coef.
s.e.
T
0.0023
0.0007
3.42
0.5454
0.0258
21.11
200
.81
.28

Coef.
-0.0001
0.2861
200
.55
.35

States with Lower Appellate Courts
Coef.
s.e.
T
0.0029
0.0008
3.71
0.5040
0.0291
17.33
156
.80
.27

Coef.
0.0013
0.2497
156
.62
.27

s.e.
0.0009
0.0335

t

States without Lower Appellate Courts
Coef.
s.e.
T
0.0011
0.0007
1.56
0.6509
0.0254
25.61
44
.81
.31

Coef.
-0.0022
0.3157
44
.45
.40

s.e.
0.0014
0.0552

t

Entries in bold are significant at the .05 level. (Year dummy variables included in the model are not displayed).
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Affirm
s.e.
0.0009
0.0328

t
-0.10
8.73

1.44
7.46

-1.51
5.72

